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Summary
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) fifth ministerial conference (held
September 10-14, 2003 in Cancun, Mexico) ended without an agreement on a
framework for continuing multilateral negotiations on agricultural trade
liberalization. The inconclusive end of the Cancun ministerial places in doubt the
ability of WTO member countries to complete the current round of negotiations by
the scheduled January 1, 2005 deadline.
WTO member countries launched this new round of multilateral trade
negotiations in November 2001 at the WTO’s fourth ministerial conference in Doha,
Qatar. Because of its emphasis on integrating developing countries into the global
trading system, the round is called the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). The new
round incorporates agriculture into a comprehensive framework that includes
negotiations on industrial tariffs, services, dispute settlement, and other trade issues.
The ambitious agenda for agricultural trade liberalization calls for substantially
improving market access, reducing and phasing out export subsidies, and
substantially reducing trade-distorting domestic support.
While the United States and the EU reached agreement on a broad framework
for negotiating agricultural trade liberalization before the Cancun meeting, a group
of developing countries, the G-22 which includes Brazil, China, India, and South
Africa, among others, made a counter-proposal which makes fewer demands on
developing countries than the EU-U.S. framework. The Chairman of the Cancun
ministerial circulated a draft declaration at the meeting that attempted to reconcile
differences between developed and developing countries on the agricultural issues.
Neither the proposals made by the United States and the EU and the G-22 nor the
Chairman’s draft declaration propose specific modalities (formulas, targets, or
timetables) for reducing tariffs and trade-distorting support and for phasing out
export subsidies.
WTO meetings are scheduled to continue, beginning with an agriculture
negotiating group meeting in October and ending with a senior level stock taking in
December 2003. Amid considerable uncertainty about prospects for completing the
round, WTO members, including the United States, the EU, the G-21 and other
countries, are taking stock and considering options for concluding the round. U.S.
trade officials also have indicated they will be focusing attention on bilateral and
regional trade negotiations.
Much of U.S. agriculture would benefit from further multilateral trade
liberalization, but some U.S. products might face stiffer foreign competition at home
or in third-country markets. DDA negotiations, if they result in new commitments
to reduce trade-distorting domestic support or export subsidies, also could affect U.S.
farm programs authorized in the 2002 farm bill (P.L. 107-171). Any agreements
reached in the new round would be taken up by Congress under fast-track procedures
for legislation to implement trade agreements as spelled out in the Trade Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-210). This report will be updated periodically.
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Agriculture in WTO Negotiations
Agriculture in the Cancun Ministerial
The WTO’s fifth ministerial conference (held September 10-14, 2003 in
Cancun, Mexico) ended without an agreement on a framework for continuing
negotiations on agricultural trade liberalization as well as a host of other trade issues,
including market access for non-agricultural goods, trade in services, WTO rules, and
dispute settlement. The inconclusive end of the Cancun ministerial places in doubt
the ability of WTO member countries to complete the current round of negotiations
by the scheduled January 1, 2005 deadline.
The immediate cause of the breakdown of the ministerial conference was refusal
by a group of poor developing counties to agree with European Union (EU) demands
to begin negotiation of multilateral rules for the so-called Singapore issues –
investment, competition, government procurement, and trade facilitation. The
meeting ended when least-developed countries refused absolutely to agree to launch
negotiations on just one of the issues – trade facilitation.
But fundamental differences especially between developed and developing
countries over developed country farm subsides and market access for agricultural
products also contributed to the failure of the round. The United States, in particular,
urged negotiations that would result in reductions in the most trade-distorting forms
of domestic support, but with some flexibility granted to developed countries to
maintain domestic support in production-limited programs, reciprocal reductions in
tariffs by all WTO members on agricultural products, and phasing out of export
subsidies. In the U.S. view, developing countries, especially the more economically
advanced ones, should begin to open their markets to agricultural products from both
developed and developing countries. The developing countries, represented by the
G-21 group (whose members include Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, and
South Africa), demanded steeper cuts in trade-distorting domestic support than
proposed by the United States and the EU and the elimination of export subsidies
(opposed by the EU), but without much in the way of reciprocal tariff reductions in
return.
Viewed as symbolic of the differences between developed and developing
countries was the issue of trade-distorting domestic subsidies for cotton. A group of
four least-developed African cotton-exporting countries–Benin, Burkina Fasso, Chad,
and Mali–proposed an end to global trade-distorting subsidies for cotton within three
years with transitional compensation to be paid to producers. The United States, in
response, proposed a global, sectoral initiative for cotton and textiles which would
have addressed subsidies for cotton and textiles, tariffs on fibers, textiles and
clothing, and non-tariff and other barriers in the fiber sector. Inability to reach a
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1 Initial negotiating proposals are at
[http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negoti_e.htm].
compromise on the cotton issue also contributed to the breakdown of the Cancun
ministerial conference.
Agriculture Negotiations: Mandate and Timetable
At the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, November 9-14,
2001, WTO member countries agreed on a declaration to begin a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs), including negotiations on agriculture. This
new round, because of its emphasis on integrating developing countries into the
world trading system, is called the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).
A first phase of agricultural trade negotiations had been underway since early
2000. The first phase produced proposals from WTO member countries for
agricultural trade liberalization, but no agreement was reached on a work program
or timetable for completing negotiations. The DDA incorporates those negotiations
into a comprehensive multilateral trade framework with an agreed upon negotiating
mandate and established benchmarks to be used to measure progress.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration mandates comprehensive negotiations on
agriculture aimed at: substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with
a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in
trade-distorting domestic support. The Declaration also provides that special and
differential (S and D) treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part of
all elements of the negotiations. (S and D treatment generally means that developing
countries would make fewer or lower reduction commitments and enjoy longer
periods of time in which to phase in concessions or commitments.) The Declaration
takes note of non-trade concerns reflected in negotiating proposals of various
member countries and confirms that non-trade concerns would be taken into account
in the negotiations.
March 31, 2003 was set as the deadline for reaching agreement on “modalities”
(targets, formulas, timetables, etc.) for achieving the mandated agriculture objectives,
but that deadline was missed. Negotiations on modalities continued as part of the
preparations for the next (and fifth) WTO Ministerial Conference which was held
September 10-14, 2003 in Cancun, Mexico. Rather than agree on modalities, the
objective for agriculture in the Cancun ministerial was to agree on a framework
(without numbers or formulas) for achieving the broad objectives of the DDA for
agriculture. No agreement on a framework was reached, however, and consequently,
the deadline for concluding the DDA by January 1, 2005 seems unlikely to be met.
Initial Negotiating Proposals
The March 31 deadline was missed because of the inability of WTO members,
especially the United States and the EU, to bridge differences in their respective,
initial negotiating proposals.1 Agreement on modalities is a prerequisite for moving
to the next step in the process, i.e., negotiating individual country commitments
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WTO Farm Support Categories
The WTO classifies domestic farmsupport policies
into three colored box categories.
Green box programs are publicly funded programs
(financed by direct outlays or foregone revenue)
that do not involve a transfer from consumers or
have the effect of providing price support to
producers. Examples of green box programs are
research programs, de-coupled income support
such as U.S. direct payments to producers that are
not contingent on any production, environmental
program payments, such as the Conservation
Reserve Program, or disaster assistance. No WTO
disciplines or reductions apply to green box
programs.
Blue box programs are direct payments made under
a production limiting program. The EU is the
primary user of blue box programs, making direct
payments to producers, for example, based on fixed
areas or yields or a fixed number of livestock.
There are currently no U.S. blue box programs.
Blue box programs also are not subject to
reduction commitments.
Amber box programs are payments that are
contingent on participation in agricultural
production, i.e., producing a crop or raising
livestock qualifies a farmer for government
payments. Examples of U.S. amber box programs
are price supports for dairy, sugar and peanuts and
loan deficiency payments or marketing loan gains
for grain, oilseed, and cotton producers. Examples
of EU amber box payments are so-called
intervention buying of farm products at prices
administratively maintained above market prices.
In contrast to green and blue box programs, amber
box payments are subject to WTO reduction
commitments.
(called schedules or lists) for reducing tariffs and domestic support and phasing out
export subsidies.
United States. The United States proposed the elimination of agricultural
export subsidies; substantial reductions in tariffs (with no country’s tariff on any
agricultural product exceeding 25%); 20% increases in tariff-rate quotas on
agricultural imports; disciplines
on export state trading
enterprises (STEs); elimination
of the blue box (see text box);
and reductions in trade-
distorting domestic support
(“amber box”) to no more than
5% of each country’s total
agricultural production value —
the objective being to make all
countries’ domestic support
levels comparable in relative
terms. So-called de minimis
exemptions, that is, trade-
distorting support less than 5%
of the total value of production
or, in the case of commodity
specific support, less than 5%
of the commodity’s total value,
would be maintained. Most of
these changes would be phased
in over 5 years. Ultimately
tariffs and trade-distorting
domestic support would be
eliminated.
The U.S. position was
supported by the Cairns Group
and many developing countries
that also want deep cuts in
domestic support and the
elimination of export subsidies.
The 17 members of the Cairns
group are: Argentina, Australia,
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica,
G u a t e m a l a , In d o n e s i a ,
Malaysia, New Zealand,
Paraguay, Philippines, South
Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay.
The Cairns Group and some
developing countries, however,
have proposed that spending on non-trade distorting domestic support (“green box”
measures) also be curbed, a position the United States opposes.
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European Union. In sharp contrast to the U.S. and Cairns Group proposals,
the EU (and Japan and Korea) proposed “progressive and substantial” reductions in
farm subsidies and agricultural tariffs based on the formulas agreed to in the Uruguay
Round negotiations (1986-1994). Thus tariffs would be reduced by 36% on average
while individual tariff lines would be subject to a 15% minimum reduction. Trade-
distorting domestic support (amber box) would be cut by 55% starting from the
bound commitment level in 2006. A new agricultural agreement would retain the
current allocation of domestic support to green, blue, and amber boxes (see text box,
p. 3). The EU proposes elimination of de minimis exemptions that the United States
says should be retained. The volume of export subsides, according to the EU
proposal, would be cut substantially, while an average 45% cut would be made in
budgetary expenditures for such measures. The EU indicates a willingness to
eliminate export subsidies on products of interest to developing countries such as
wheat or oilseeds, provided that no other forms of subsidy (such as export credit
guarantees) are provided by other WTO members.
The EU proposal provides for taking non-trade concerns into account.
Measures, including subsidies, to promote rural development, protect the
environment, or enhance animal welfare, the EU says, should be considered as green
box measures and therefore exempt from WTO disciplines.
Developing Countries. Developing countries, a large and diverse group that
constitutes the majority of WTO members, in numerous initial proposals, called for
rapid dismantling of developed countries’ trade barriers and the elimination of
production-linked domestic subsidies. Developing countries are also seeking
exemptions for developing country domestic support deemed essential for economic
development. While developing countries are seeking substantial reductions in
agricultural tariffs of developed countries, many are resistant to the idea of reciprocal
tariff reductions, preferring instead to be accorded special and differential treatment
which would entail maintaining tariffs or phasing them down over lengthy time
periods. Developing countries, including many of the poorest, that benefit from
preferential treatment for their exports to developed country markets also want such
benefits to continue. Countries receiving preferences fear they may lose markets to
other developing countries if preferential schemes are replaced with across-the-board
reduction or elimination of tariffs.
Agricultural Policy Reform and Trade Liberalization
Some suggest that the success of the agriculture negotiations depends on
agricultural policy reform in the EU and the United States. Both have recently made
changes in domestic farm policy that could significantly impact on the negotiations.
European Union. The EU has recently enacted a number of significant
reforms in its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), including substantial de-coupling
of income support from production, reductions in price supports, and a shift of funds
from domestic support for agricultural production to rural development. In WTO
terminology, the reforms enable the EU to shift substantial amber and blue box
spending into the green box which, under WTO rules, is not subject to reduction
commitments. These reforms should enable the EU to accept cuts in trade-distorting
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2The Chairman’s report on modalities for the agricultural negotiations can be accessed at
[http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negoti_mod2stdraft_e.htm].
domestic support or the reduction of export subsidies in the Doha agriculture
negotiations.
United States. In the United States, the President on May 13, 2002, signed
into law a farm bill (P.L. 107-171) to replace the 1996 Federal Agricultural
Improvement and Reform, or FAIR, Act). Critics say this new farm law could raise
trade-distorting domestic support above U.S. WTO commitments to reduce such
spending. Critics also argue that inclusion in the farm bill of new trade-distorting
supports, such as price-triggered counter-cyclical income support, undermines the
U.S. position in the new round. However, the farm bill stipulates that the Secretary
shall, to the maximum extent possible, make adjustments in U.S. farm support to
ensure that it does not exceed levels allowable under the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture. Moreover, U.S. trade officials insist that the United States has not
wavered from its negotiating objective of securing substantial reductions in domestic
subsidies, including U.S. subsidies, that distort trade, and that congressional support
for agricultural trade liberalization remains strong.
The Modalities Proposal2
To facilitate the process of reaching agreement on modalities, the chairman of
the Agriculture Negotiating Group, Stuart Harbinson, issued prior to the March 31,
2003 deadline, a set of proposals. Harbinson’s proposals attempted to steer a middle
course between the U.S. and EU negotiating positions, while according special and
differential treatment to developing countries. Chairman Harbinson proposed
specific formulas and numerical targets for dealing with the three so-called pillars of
the agriculture negotiations: market access, export competition, and domestic
support. His proposal for modalities, universally criticized as being too specific, was
not adopted by the agriculture negotiating group, and the modalities deadline was
missed. However, many expect that Harbinson’s modalities report may be reviewed
later as a source of methods for achieving the DDA ‘s agricultural objectives.
Market Access. Harbinson proposed a “banded” approach to tariff reduction.
For tariffs greater than 90% ad valorem, the simple average would be reduced by
60% subject to a minimum cut of 45% per tariff line; for agricultural tariffs lower
than or equal to 90% but greater than 15%, the simple average reduction would be
50% subject to a minimum cut of 35% per tariff line; and for all agricultural tariffs
lower than or equal to 15%, the simple average reduction would be 40% subject to
a minimum cut of 25% per tariff line.
Export Competition. Harbinson’s modalities report recommended that
export subsidies be eliminated over a ten-year period. Export credit and food aid
programs would also be covered by new rules. Repayment terms for export credits
would be limited to a maximum of six months but developing countries would be
allowed longer repayment periods. For the most part, food aid would take the form
of unrestricted financial grants to purchase food internationally or regionally under
the Harbinson recommendations. However, food aid in kind for development
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projects could be provided through United Nations food agencies or UN food agency
projects operated by non-governmental or charitable organizations.
Domestic Support. The Harbinson modalities report called for a 60%
reduction in trade-distorting (amber box) support. The report also suggested that
trade-distorting support tied to production limits (blue box support used primarily by
the EU) be capped and then reduced by 50% over five years. The modalities report
also included an option for eliminating the blue box altogether by including it in the
amber box category and subjecting it to a 60% reduction. The de minimis exemptions
would be cut by half over five years.
U.S. Reaction. While U.S. trade negotiators indicated they considered the
modalities report as a reference point for further negotiations, they were highly
critical of specific proposals. Both U.S. and Cairns Group officials said the
recommendations fell far short of their earlier proposals. U.S. criticisms, among
others, were that the market access provisions did not result in tariff harmonization
(i.e., reduction to comparable levels) and that the application of the Harbinson
approach would still leave very high tariffs on many products, especially meat
products. U.S. trade officials welcomed the elimination of export subsidies, but they
noted that the ten-year phase-out schedule should be considerably shortened.
According to U.S. negotiators, reduction proposals for amber box support would
enable the EU to maintain trade-distorting blue box payments and to continue to
provide considerably more trade-distorting amber box support than could the United
States. Under current WTO rules, U.S. amber box support is capped at $19 billion
annually, while the EU’s is capped at $67 billion. Under the Harbinson proposal,
U.S. amber box support would fall to around $8 billion per year, while the EU’s
would be capped at $27 billion per year.
Not only the Administration, but many in Congress reacted negatively to the
Harbinson proposals. A particular concern was that the proposed 60% reduction in
trade-distorting, or amber box, support, did not “level the playing field” between the
United States and the EU. Permitted EU trade distorting subsidies would still be
more than three times the level of permitted U.S. subsidies. Also in the 2002 Trade
Act, Congress had made preserving export credit guarantee programs a major
negotiating objective. Anyproposals for tightening export credit program disciplines
are thus likely to come under intense congressional scrutiny.
EU Reaction. The EU also reacted negatively to the Harbinson proposals. In
the EU view, they were unbalanced and placed most of the burden of adjustment on
the EU. The EU was particularly concerned that, with the exception of adding
animal welfare subsidies to the category of non-trade distorting (or green box)
subsidies, the Harbinson report ignored non-trade concerns. The EU criticized the
report’s call for the elimination of export subsidies without similarly disciplining
export credit programs, such as U.S. export credit guarantees. EU officials argued
also that blue box subsidies are less trade distorting than amber box support and
should not be subject to the same reduction requirements as amber box support.
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The EU-U.S. Framework Proposal
As the date for the Cancun ministerial meeting approached, the objective of the
ministerial changed from agreeing on specific modalities to reaching agreement on
a broad framework for accomplishing the agriculture objectives. An EU-U.S.
framework proposal put forth on August 13 represents an effort to bridge the
significant gaps between their previous positions and to provide a basis for agreement
on a way forward at Cancun. A political agreement on agriculture between the EU
and the United States is critical to the success of the Doha round, because they are
the world’s largest exporters and importers of agricultural products. In retrospect,
observers have noted that while an EU-U.S. framework agreement may have been
necessary in order to move the DDA round toward agreement, it was not sufficient.
One consequence of the EU-U.S. agreement was to provoke a coalition of developing
countries (see below) to make a counter-proposal that went beyond what the EU and
United States had been able to agree to in their framework proposals.
Domestic Support. The EU-U.S. framework agreement proposes that the
most-trade distorting domestic support measures would be reduced according to a
percentage range to be negotiated. WTO members could use blue-box type
payments based on fixed areas and yields (such as U.S. counter-cyclical payments);
or payments made on 85% or less of the base level of production or livestock
payments based on a fixed number of animals as employed by the EU). Such “blue
box “support could not exceed 5% of the total value of production by the end of an
implementation period. De minimis exemptions would also be reduced. The sum of
allowed trade-distorting support, de minimis, and blue box spending must be
significantly less than the final bound level in 2004.
Market Access. Tariffs would be reduced using a blended approach. Some
tariff lines would be subject to a Uruguay Round type reduction formula (i.e., the
average tariff level would be reduced by some percentage, while individual tariff
lines would be subject to a minimum percentage reduction) to be negotiated.
Minimum reductions here would be counterbalanced by a combination of tariff cuts
and expanding tariff rate quotas (TRQs). Some tariff lines would be reduced using
a Swiss formula. and some tariffs lines would be duty-free. The use of the special
agricultural safeguard measure (SSM) by developed countries remains under
negotiation, but an SSM would be established for developing countries for import-
sensitive products. Some portion of developing countries’ exports would receive
duty-free treatment through a combination of across the board tariff reductions or
elimination and preferential access. Developing countries would benefit from S and
D treatment including lower tariff reductions and longer implementation periods.
Export Competition. Export subsidies would be eliminated over a period to
be negotiated for a specific list of products of particular interest to developing
countries. For remaining products, budgetary and quantity allowances would be
negotiated. Trade distorting aspects of export credits would be reduced in parallel
with export subsidies by reducing the repayment terms to commercial practice
(usually defined as 6 months). Disciplines would be developed to prevent
commercial displacement through food aid shipments. Disciplines ending single
desk export privileges, prohibitions of special financing privileges, and disciplines
on pricing practices also would be established for export STEs.
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3Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture is known as the “peace clause” because
it prevents most challenges in WTO dispute settlement against another WTO member
country that is complying with its WTO commitments. The peace clause expires at the end
of 2003. When the peace clause expires, it is possible that WTO member countries’
subsidies could be challenged in WTO dispute settlement, especially by developing
countries.
Other Matters. The EU-U.S. framework proposes to deny the full benefits of
special and differential treatment to significant net agricultural exporting countries
(such as Brazil or Argentina), while maintaining them for the least-developed WTO
members. Issues the framework says are still being negotiated include the “peace
clause”3, non-trade concerns, implementation period, sectoral initiatives, and
geographical indications.
Implications. Many WTO member countries expressed encouragement that
the United States and the EU could reach agreement on broad parameters of the
agricultural negotiations given the strong differences in their initial negotiating
positions. Nevertheless, both other developed countries, like Australia, and
developing countries, like Brazil, criticized the framework because, in their view, it
did not meet the ambitious trade liberalization objectives of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration, especially with respect to trade-distorting domestic subsidies.
Although the EU-U.S. framework would require reductions in spending on
domestic support, it would not require much, if any, change in farm policies. Some
have suggested that the proposal’s blue box provision has been structured in such a
way as to give the United States the flexibility to shift up to $10 billion in trade-
distorting counter-cyclical payments into this category. Both the Cairns Group and
developing countries have expressed dissatisfaction that the framework does not meet
the Doha mandate of substantial reductions in trade-distorting support. Those
countries also would like to see limits placed on green box spending which they say
also can distort trade.
The framework agreement implies that the United States has moved away, at
least for the time being, from its initial objective of total elimination of export
subsidies. The framework calls for eliminating such subsidies on products of special
interest to developing countries and for reductions in the budgetary expenditure and
volume of subsidies on remaining products. U.S. supporters of export credit
programs are likely to be wary of the framework’s proposal to “mirror” commitments
made on export subsidies with disciplines on export credit programs, particularly to
limit the repayment period for such credits to 6 months. Some observers suggest that
U.S. willingness to drop its insistence on elimination of export subsidies is a trade-
off for limited preservation of its export credit programs.
There are no specific numerical formulas for tariff reduction in the EU-U.S.
framework so it is difficult to tell how much market access would be expanded.
Import-sensitive products would be subject to lower tariff reductions, but lower
reductions would be counterbalanced to some degree by expanded TRQs. The
framework calls for S and D treatment of developing countries, but specifically











mention is made of duty-free treatment for imports from the least developed
countries.
The G-21 Counter-Proposal
A group of 21 developing countries put forth a counter-proposal to the EU-U.S.
framework which makes a clear distinction between what should be required of
developed and developing countries and would impose greater trade liberalization
obligations on developed than on developing country members of the WTO. The G-
21 counter-proposal calls for deeper cuts in domestic support, the elimination of
export subsidies, and emphasizes special and differential treatment in tariff
reductions and market opening for developing countries.
Domestic Support. This group seeks deeper cuts in domestic support than
proposed by the EU-U.S. framework. Trade distorting domestic support would be
reduced on a product specific basis, the blue box would be eliminated, and green box
support would be capped or reduced for developed countries. Developed countries
would reduce de minimis support
and the sum of amber box and de
minimis support would be subject
to a percentage cut.
Market Access. The
blended approach proposed by the
EU and United States would be
used by developed countries that
would also be required to expand
TRQs and reduce in-quota tariff
rates to zero. The SSM would be
discontinued for developed
countries, but maintained for
developing countries. Developed
countries would provide duty free
access for all tropical products and
other products of special interest to
developing countries. In contrast, tariff reductions for developing countries would
be according to a Uruguay Round formula, with no commitment to expand TRQs or
reduce in-quota tariff rates.
Export Competition. Export subsidies on products of particular interest to
developing countries would be eliminated over a time period to be determined.
Export subsidies on remaining products would be eliminated over another time
period to be determined. Export credit programs would be regulated by a rules-
based approach taking into account the needs of least developed and net food
importing developing countries.
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The African Cotton Proposal
An example of a developing country proposal to substantially reduce trade-
distorting support is the proposal by four African countries — Benin, Burkina Faso,
Chad and Mali — to eliminate developed countries’ trade-distorting domestic
support and export subsidies for their cotton producers. The four countries propose
that all WTO members’ domestic support measures and export subsidies for cotton
be eliminated over a three-year period (January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2006).
Subsidies would be reduced in equal annual installments to at least one-third of the
total level of subsidies granted. The WTO should establish a transitional financial
compensation mechanism in favor of cotton-exporting developing countries affected
by the subsidies. Beginning January 1, 2004, and continuing until all domestic
support and export subsidies have been eliminated, subsidizing countries would
provide financial assistance equivalent to the loss of export revenue experienced by
the developing country producers. Data from the International Cotton Advisory
Council would be used to calculate developing country revenue losses. The proposal,
which is on the agenda of the Cancun ministerial conference, does not address
adjustment problems of developed country cotton producers.
Draft Declaration for Agricultural Negotiations
The developing countries’ counter-proposal reflects the continuing
differences between developed and developing countries in the agriculture
negotiations. A draft declaration for the Cancun Ministerial, circulated by the
Chairman of Cancun meeting, but not agreed, represents an attempt to reconcile these
differences and proposes a framework for establishing modalities for the agriculture
negotiations.
Domestic Support. The draft declaration states that trade distorting
domestic support would be reduced according to a percentage range and that de
minimis exemptions would be reduced also by a negotiated percentage. Blue box
payments would continue but could not exceed 5% of the value of agricultural
production in the 2000-2002 period and thereafter would be subject to an annual
linear percentage reduction for a further period of years. The sum of allowed trade
distorting support and de minimis would be reduced so that it is significantly less
than the sum of de minimis, blue box and trade-distorting support in 2000. Green
box criteria would remain under negotiation. Developing countries would benefit
from S and D treatment and be exempt from de minimis reductions.
Cotton. The draft declaration recognized the importance of cotton for a
number of developing countries and the need for urgent action to address trade
distortions in global cotton markets. It instructed the WTO negotiating groups to
begin a consultative process to address the distortions not only in cotton markets but
in related sectors of man-made fibers, textiles, and clothing. In addition, the draft
proposed consultation between the WTO, the World Bank, and the UN Food and
Agriculture organization to work with cotton-producing countries to direct programs
and resources toward diversification.
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Market Access. The draft declaration also calls for a blended approach to
market access with S and D treatment for developing countries that could designate
special products which would only be subject to a linear cuts and no new
commitments regarding TRQs. An SSM would be established for developing
countries although an SSM for developed countries would still be under negotiation.
Developed countries also would seek to provide duty-free access for some minium
percent of imports from developing countries either through tariff elimination or via
preferential access.
Export Competition. The draft declaration calls for the elimination, over
a yet to be determined time period, of export subsidies on products of special interest
to developing countries. For remaining products, WTO members would reduce, with
a view to phasing out, budgetary and quantity allowances for export subsidies. The
subsidy element of export credits for products of special interest to developing
countries would be eliminated by reducing repayment terms to commercial practice
(usually defined as six months). The subsidy element of export credits for other
products would be reduced in tandem with export subsidies. Additional disciplines
to prevent food aid from displacing commercial sales would be agreed to, but the
special needs of least developed countries and net food importing developing
countries would be taken into consideration. The question of an end date for phasing
out all export subsidies would remain under negotiation. Developing countries
would receive S and D treatment for reductions of export subsidies.
Other Matters. The draft declaration says that least developed countries
would be exempt from reduction commitments and that the objective of duty- and
quota-free market access for products of least developed countries would be
expeditiously pursued. Finally, the draft declaration says that the Harbinson report
would serve as a reference document for further work on modalities.
Agriculture Negotiations After Cancun
Status of the Draft Declaration. Preliminary assessments of the draft
declaration reveal that differences remain especially between developed and
developing countries about the nature and extent of agricultural trade liberalization.
The United States and the EU both criticized the proposed reduction in blue
box subsidies, which they join in arguing are less trade-distorting. The United States
and the EU also criticized the declarations’s statement that the green box remains
“under negotiation.” The EU maintains that its ability to agree to reductions in trade-
distorting (amber box) support depends on the continuation of blue and green box
policies. Brazil and Australia criticized the declaration’s continuation of the blue box
and the failure to put a cap on green box spending as inconsistent with the Doha
mandate. The African countries expressed dissatisfaction that consultation rather
than immediate action was proposed in relation to their proposal for ending cotton
subsidies with transitional compensation for income losses.
The United States criticized market access provisions for developing
countries in the Chairman’s draft. The United States argued that developing
countries would not be required to make sufficient market opening because they
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could select special products to be exempt from cuts and would not be required to
expand TRQs.
The EU said that the draft went too far in suggesting that an end date for
phasing out export subsidies remained under negotiation because the Doha
declaration did not mandate such a date. Australia and a number of developing
countries argued however that the declaration should set a target date for eliminating
export subsidies.
Both the United States and the EU have indicated that, despite their
dissatisfaction with various proposals, the draft declaration for agriculture could
serve as a basis for negotiations. Brazil, one of the leaders of the G-21, also has
indicated that agricultural negotiations could proceed on the basis of the draft
ministerial.
Next Steps. WTO meetings are scheduled to continue, beginning with an
agriculture negotiating group meeting in October and ending with a senior level stock
taking in December 2003. Amid considerable uncertainty about prospects for
completing the round by January 2005, WTO members, including the United States,
the EU, the G-21 and other countries, are taking stock and considering options for
concluding the round. U.S. trade officials also have indicated they also will be
focusing attention on bilateral and regional trade negotiations.
In Congress
Congress would take up any agreements that result from the Doha round of
trade negotiations under fast track procedures (in P.L. 107-210) for congressional
consideration of legislation to implement trade agreements. In the meantime,
according to the procedures established in P.L. 107-210, Congress and the
Administration would be consulting as negotiations proceed. Interaction during the
period of consultation between Congress and the Administration on negotiating
positions and strategies would lay the groundwork for congressional consideration
of an agreement. Congressional fast track procedures would expire by June 1, 2005,
but could be extended if the President satisfies the consultation requirements in P.L.
107-210 and if progress is being made in meeting the negotiating objectives set forth
in the Trade Act of 2002.
